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中文摘要：
基于博弈视角构建模型，探讨企业在维持和退出联盟两种情况下的古诺-纳什均衡结果，求解权益结构影响下的高技术企业创新联盟稳定域，并分析研发溢出和研发成本分担对高技术企业创新联盟稳定性的影响．结果显示，研发溢出对联盟稳定性具有正向作用，但受技术水平差异影响，其正向作用只在一定范围内有效；合理的研发成本分担比例能为研发溢出发挥正向作用创造条件并有助于维持联盟内部关系稳定，但需满足两点，即实现联盟整体利益最大化以及企业加入联盟后的收益大于不加入时的收益．最后，提出促进高技术企业创新联盟稳定发展的建议，以期为管理者维持联盟有效运行提供一定理论指导．
英文摘要：
Based on the game theory, it discussed the Cournot-Nash equilibrium result of enterprises in the case of maintaining or withdrawing the alliance. It built the model to explore the influence of equity structure on the stability domain of high technology enterprises innovation alliance. Also, it analyzed the influence of R＆D spillover and R＆D cost sharing on the stability of high technology enterprises innovation alliance. The results show that R＆D spillovers have positive effect on alliance stability only within a certain range due to the impact of technical level differences. Reasonable R＆D cost sharing can create conditions for R＆D spillover to play a positive role and maintain stable relationship within the alliance. However, two conditions must be met：maximize the alliance benefits, and benefits of each company in alliance are greater than the gains when do not join. Eventually, it put forward some suggestions to promote stable development of the alliance, so as to provide some guidances for managers to maintain effective operation of alliances.
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