针对传统的批发价格契约无法实现供应链协调,探讨了在市场需求为不确定条件下,不公平厌恶对批发价格契约协调供应链的影响.在零售商是不公平厌恶的假设下,分别不利不公平厌恶和有利不公平厌恶两种情况,建立数学模型.研究结果表明在有利不公平厌恶下,批发价格契约可以提高供应链的整体利润和更好地协调供应链,从而延拓了传统的批发价格契约协调供应链的理论,有利于批发价格契约协调供应链的应用.最后用算例验证了新结论.
Aiming at the problem that the traditional wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain, the paper studies the effects that inequity aversion has on coordination of supply chain by wholesale price contract with uncertain demand. Based on inequity aversion retailer assumption, a mathematical model is formulated which takes into considerations advantageous inequity aversion and disadvantageous inequity aversion. The results show that the wholesale price contract can improve the profit of the whole chain and better coordinate the supply chain in advantageous inequity aversion case, which enrich the theory of the wholesale price contract and facilitate its application in real life. In the last part of this paper, a numerical example is used to prove the findings.