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中文摘要：
控股股东对小股东的侵占已经成为公司治理研究中的主要问题，但控股股东与债权人的冲突还较少受到关注。通过建立模型，分析了控股股东的机会主义行为对中小股东与债权人的影响。研究结果表明：在无负债情况下，控股股东与小股东之间的信息不对称造成了企业过早及高风险的投资；在负债融资的情况下，由于收益函数性质的差别，股东与债权人之间的信息不对称是资产替代发生的根源。此外，为了获得控制权私利，控股股东大化自身价值的行为使得企业投资更早，投资的风险性更大，损害了中小股东与债权人的利益。
英文摘要：
The expropriation of minor shareholders by controlling shareholders is the central problems in the study of corporate governance. But the agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors have not been paid attention to. Effects of controlling shareholder＇s opportunism on middle and minor shareholders and creditors were analyzed by the model. The results show that （1） On the condition of no debt financing, the information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and mi- nority shareholders induces the early and hazardous investment; （2） The difference of income function and information asymmetry between shareholders and creditors induce the asset substitution and （3） On the condition of debt financing, in order to acquire private benefits of control, the behavior of con- trolling shareholders＇ maximizing own value make the investment of corporate more early and haz- ardous.
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