该文主要研究了网络服务市场中的两大类群体的动态博弈关系:网络服务提供商(ISP)提供服务,多接口移动主机用户选择服务.首先,建立了网络服务市场中ISP的服务组合和多接口移动主机用户的交互模型.其次,使用非合作博弈理论分析了独占垄断市场中的讨价还价博弈和寡头垄断市场中的动态博弈过程,论证了在理想条件下,ISP推出多种不同于其他ISP的服务组合时可以获得更多用户和收益,并得出:有限次重复博弈的子博弈精炼纳什均衡是每一阶段各个ISP均调整至相同服务组合,最终结果是ISP为每个用户制定一套服务组合;无限次重复博弈在特定条件下,存在一个特定的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,即所有ISP均不调整服务组合.最后,通过仿真验证了在独占垄断市场中ISP的价格垄断地位,给出了ISP定价的建议,验证了在寡头垄断市场中ISP动态博弈的过程,给出了根据用户群体特征制定服务组合的方法.
This paper focuses on the dynamic game relationship between ISPs and host users in the Internet service market, where ISPs provide services and multiple interface mobile hosts select services. Through the Internet service market modeling, service composition and host users, bargaining in the Exclusive Monopoly market and the dynamic game procedure in the Oligopoly market have been analyzed by the non-cooperative game theory. Further, it has been proved that under an ideal condition, consumers could gain more profits if an ISP offers various unique service combinations. It shows that the finitely repeated game's sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is every stage game adjusting to the same strategy, and the final result is that ISPs develop a service combination for each user; for the infinitely repeated game under certain conditions, there is a specific sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. That is, none of the ISPs adjusts to the strategy. At last, suggestions for ISPs in the price making process is given by the confirmation of the ISP price monopoly position in the Exclusive Monopoly market through experiments, and the methods of service combinations selection based on the features of user groups will be developed by testing the ISP dynamic game procedure in the Oligopoly market.