从管理者“短视”角度研究市场估值对技术创新的影响机制,并在此基础上进一步研究管理者持股以及管理者任期的情境效应。以2006-2014年深圳A股制造业企业为研究对象的面板数据实证研究发现,企业的市场估值越高,则技术创新越多;管理者持股增强市场估值与技术创新之间的正向关系;管理者既有任期越长,管理者持股对市场估值与技术创新关系的正向作用越强,管理者预期任期越长,管理者持股对市场估值与技术创新关系的正向作用也越强。
This paper studies the influence mechanism of market valuation on technological innovation from the perspective of "short-sightedness" of managers, and further studies the effect of managers' holdings and manager's term on the basis of this. Based on the panel data of A-share manufacturing enterprises from 2006 to 2014, we found that the higher the market valuation is, the more technological innovation is; the shareholding of managers enhances the positive correlation between market valuation and technological innovation; The longer the term of manager is, the more positive the relationship between market value and technology innovation is; the longer the manager's expected term is, the stronger positive effect of manager's shareholding on the relationship between market valuation and technological innovation is.