中文摘要：

针对RFID技术使用中下游“搭便车”与上游信息泄露行为导致RFID技术无法顺利在供应链管理中推广的现象，构建由一个供应商对两个零售商组成的考虑RFID投资决策和信息泄露问题的供应链模型。运用Stackelberg博弈模型，研究RFID技术的采用对供应链成员最优行为策略的影响，并在此基础上进一步分析RFID投资决策与供应商信息泄露行为对主导零售商订购决策的影响。通过理论分析与数值算例得出：当主导零售商收益共享率和最优订货量在一定取值范围时，供应商积极参与RFID建设并共同防止供应链信息泄露；产品残值、商品错放率、标签成本、收益共享率等因素会对主导零售商实施RFID技术决策与最优订购量产生不同程度的影响。

英文摘要：

The extension of RFID in supply chain management may deviate from the action of downstream ＂Free-Riding＂ behaviors and upstream information leakage. To solve this issue, a one-supplier-two-retailer supply chain model was established which considers both RFID investment and information leakage. The optimal actions of members in supply chain were analyzed with RFID by using Stackelberg model. The impact of dominant retailer＇s RFID investment strategy were further analyzed as well as supplier＇s leakage strategy on order decision. The result shows that the supplier will be deeply involved in the investment of RFID and the presentation of supply chain information leakage when the dominant retailer offers a revenue sharing rate and optimal order quality in a specific range. Moreover, the different product natures （salvage value, misplaced product, label cost, revenue sharing rate, etc. ） have disproportionate impacts on the RFID investment decision and order deviation.