中文摘要：

本文通过构造比较静态与比较动态模型，对基于网络服务提供商平台两边用户异质情形下平台各层次配置相应内容流量的接入服务定价机制的网络投资激励与社会福利的效应进行了研究。发现，在数字化的网络提供商平台实行网络非中立的流量带宽配置，可以实现利益相关者均衡，满足在既定带宽下的不同服务需求，从而消除平台用户的交易外部性；不同接入速率敏感度的服务歧视，可以形成内容提供商一边的竞争，从而改善内容质量；网络服务提供商平台层次逻辑结构之间存在的相关性，使网络服务提供商可以利用杠杆效应，对平台的其他层次施加市场势力：在给定物理网络管制的情形下，强制性在网络其他层次推行网络中立管制会给平台的最优定价结构带来斯彭斯价格扭曲，而且加剧下游的竞争。

英文摘要：

In this paper, I configurate comparative static and dynamic model respectively to analysis the effections of social welfare and incentive investment to broadband with the internet service provider （ISP） of reshaping traffics on platform so as to match up with the difference demand elasticity of subscriber for the hold- up problem. I find that it is feasible to realize coalitional equilibrium and internalize the traded externality and membership externality in the manner of network non-neutrality by the ISP＇s platform, and then, given the broadband condition, discrimination between the preferential speed of transmission could be resulted in competition on the side of the content provider and improve the quality of content, so, the efficiency of broadband allocation and social welfare would be increased accordingly. Additionally and more importantly, I also draw conclusion that the market power of physical net work can be used as a tools of leverage to affect on the adjacent regime which implication that the mandatory neutrality regulation could be resulted in distortion of the optimum price structure and intensive competition downstream on ISP＇s platform.