中文摘要：

针对由单个处于领导地位的汽车制造商和单个作为跟随者的汽车租赁商组成的租赁供应链，分析了租赁商资金不足对租赁供应链的影响。在完全信息下，运用Stackelberg博弈理论分别对租赁供应链在两种融资模式下的博弈模型进行分析，给出了制造商与租赁商的最优决策。证明了租赁商选择内部融资可以增加汽车订购量，提高租赁收益。研究显示集中控制决策下制造商选择内部融资模式比外部融资模式更优。最后运用数值算例验证了研究结论。

英文摘要：

The car rental supply chain system was studied under capital constraint, wherecarmaker is the leader of Stackelberg game with rental company as its followers. The impact ofinsufficient funding on rental supply chain was analyzed. Under complete information, by usingStackelberg game theory, the internal financing and external financing model were analyzedrespectively,and the optimal decisions of carmaker and rental company were given under the twomodes. It is proved that internal financing can increase car order quantity and company＇s rentalprofits. It is shown that under the centralized control strategy, the manufacturer choosing theinternal financing mode is better than the external financing model. The conclusions aredemonstrated by a numerical example.