中文摘要：

文章运用动态博弈的方法研究了在网络外部性特征显著的本国市场中，当政府对进口企业征收从量关税时，提供具有纵向差异产品的国外企业和国内企业的价格竞争和兼容策略问题。结论表明，网络外部性加剧了国内外企业间的价格竞争，但相互兼容可以弱化竞争激烈程度，因此二者都偏好兼容；关税对质量差异具有强烈的替代效应，适当的关税水平既有利于本国企业成长又有利于国外企业的市场进入；边际兼容成本的大小决定了国内外企业的最优兼容水平的高低，即决定了谁具有更强的兼容动机。文章结论在一定程度上为相关企业的兼容性决策和政府的关税调控提供了理论支持。

英文摘要：

By employing dynamic game methods, price competition and compatibility decisions between domestic and foreign finns in an industry with network externalities when tariff is levied are focused on. The results show that network externality inten- sifies price competition while the compatibility weakens the competition. The tariff as a substitute for quality differences deter- mines the market advantage position between domestic and foreign firms. Hence, suitable tariff is helpful for both the development of domestic firm and the market entry of foreign finn. Furthermore, the marginal compatibility costs determine the optimal compatibility degree. These results would be useful for the decisions making of firms and government.