中文摘要：

随着资本市场收购热潮的兴起，我国敌意收购事件越来越多。作为控制权市场的监督机制，敌意收购能够有效监督管理者的行为，然而管理者基于管理“壕沟效应”，倾向于使用不同的反收购策略以保障其职位的稳定性。本文全面回顾了国内外有关反收购策略的研究进展，首先，从委托代理理论、管家理论以及基于资产专用性理论的控制权分配机制分别解释管理者采用反收购策略的动因；其次，从管理者相对权力和制度环境的视角分析了影响管理者采用反收购策略的情境因素；最后，综述了主要反收购策略以及不同反收购策略的经济后果，包括对市场反应、收购结果、管理者行为以及目标公司财务绩效的影响，发现相关研究结论是不一致的。本文认为，未来需要对反收购策略使用的动机、情境条件和经济后果做进一步研究。

英文摘要：

With the rise of corporate takeover, the capital market is convinced more hostile acquisitions in China. Hostile acquisition is an important market for corporate control that can monitor managers; however, managerial entrenchment hypothesis argues that managers adopt different takeover defenses to protect their jobs. This paper reviews existing research and finds that agency theory, stewardship theory as well as mechanism of control arrangements based on asset specificity theory can explain reasons why takeover defenses are used. Then this paper regards manager power and institutions as important situational variables that can affect the anti-takeover devices adopted. This paper also introduces the anti-takeover devices that are most frequently used and the consequences of adoption, including the effects on market reaction, takeover results, manager behavior and financial performance of target companies. Overall, the findings are inconclusive. This paper calls for more papers to strengthen the study of theoretical motives, applicable conditions and economic consequences of anti-takeover devices.