中文摘要：

在农产品生产和需求随机的背景下,并基于政府对零售商的税收补贴政策,研究在只有一个生产商和一个零售商的情况下的供应链的优化决策问题.生产商和零售商之间存在Stackelberg博弈,并且证明了存在唯一的Stackelberg均衡解.研究结果表明,政府补贴政策能够增加供应链的整体利润.此外,在合理的政府补贴政策以及外生参数下,批发价格契约具有协调供应链的可能性,这不同于传统供应链中批发价格契约不能协调供应链.

英文摘要：

Under the background of random output and random market demand of agriculture, and with government subsidies for the retailer, a one-period two-echelon supply chain optimization consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer was studied. A Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer was considered, and the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium was derived. The results show that the government subsidy policy can improve the supply chain＇s total profit. In addition, an interesting finding shows that, under the reasonable government subsidies and exogenous parameters, the supply chain can be coordinated with a simple wholesale price contract, which does not happen in traditional cases.