利用现代契约经济学的分析方法,从机制设计的角度对两种技术产品产出水平条件下的技术许可转让定价机制进行了分析。通过分析发现,在对称信息条件下,技术所有者对具有较高产出水平的技术使用者在进行技术许可时收取较高的固定费用;在技术使用者存在道德风险时,技术许可转让的定价形式是一种纯固定费用形式;相对于对称信息情况,具有较高产出水平的技术使用者给技术所有者带来的收益是相对降低的,而技术使用者从事较高程度投入的技术产业化行为给其带来的收益则是相对增加的。
By using the modern contracts economics,this paper analyses the technology transferring pricing mechanism of technology licensing with two kinds of technology product levels.The conclusion is: the technology licensor receives a higher licensing fixed fee from the licensee with a higher product level under the conditions of perfect information;the technology licensing fee is a kind of pure fixed fee when the technology licensee can actualize moral hazard behavior;when there are licensee's moral hazard,the revenue of the licensor,which is from the licensee with a higher product level,is depressed compared with the perfect information,on the other hand,the revenue of the licensee is increased when the licensee actualizes a higher degree behavior of technology industrialization.