中文摘要：

考察上级政府考核机制对地方政府和产污企业间演化博弈的策略稳定性影响构建动态支付矩阵，建立演化博弈模型，讨论了围绕中心点的稳定演化策略并进行仿真模拟。主要研究结论是：以执法结果为导向的考核模式无法保证博弈策略趋于稳定；以环境质量为导向的考核模式有助于形成演化稳定策略，但前提是“环境管理效应系数”比较高，即地方政府努力程度对环境质量的改善贡献比较大。以环境治理过程为导向的考核模式中，累进惩罚制度将促进地方政府持续稳定地履行环境监管职责，从而达到演化博弈均衡。

英文摘要：

Effects of performance assessment mechanisms on evolutionary stability between local governments and enterprises are studied here. An evolutionary game model is established based on dynamic payoff matrixes, and evolutionarily stable strategies around the central point are discussed and simulated. Three main conclusions emerges： assessment mechanisms focused on amount of fines can＇t make out ESS; assessment mechanisms focused on environmental results are effective only if there are significant relationship between local governmental efforts and environmental outcomes; assessment mechanisms focused on progressive disciplinal rate will make out ESS.