中文摘要：

在考虑零售商促销努力竞争的基础上，研究促销努力成本信息对称和非对称两种情形下的供应链决策问题，并对如何在转移支付契约下促使零售商传递真实的促销努力成本信息进行分析。研究表明，零售商促销努力成本的信息价值会随着产品批发价格、制造商减排成本以及零售商竞争程度的增加呈下降趋势，随销售价格的增加呈上升趋势；且转移支付契约的引入可以促使零售商传递真实的促销努力成本信息，提高制造商以及供应链的利润。最后通过算例验证了转移支付契约的有效性，并对促销努力成本系数进行了灵敏度分析。

英文摘要：

Considering the retailer＇ s competition on promotional etiorts, the supply cnamdecision models were constructed based on the promotional effort cost information symmetry andinformation asymmetry. How to use the transfer payment contract to realize retailers＇ informationsymmetry was discussed. The results show that the retailers＇ promotional effort cost informationhas a certain value. With the increasing of wholesale prices, the cost of emission-reduction and thedegree of competition, it decreases. Meanwhile, with the increasing of sale price, it rises. Theretailers can transfer the real information of promotional effort cost by using the transfer paymentcontract. Simultaneously, the manufacturer＇s profit and supply chain＇s profit increased. Finally,numerical example was given to illustrate the validity of transfer payment contract, and thesensitivity analysis of parameter such as the coefficient of promotional effort cost was presented.