中文摘要：

本文比较了政治关系和高质量会计信息的银行信贷资本配置效率。以2001—2009年在我国沪深两市上市的民营企业为样本，研究发现：政治关系比高质量的会计信息更有助于企业获得数额更大、期限更长的银行贷款（“融资效应”）；但随银行贷款的增加，政治关系组企业的投资效率既未提高也未降低，而高质量会计信息组企业的投资效率显著提高（“投资效应”）。即政治关系组企业虽获得了更多的银行贷款，但资本利用效率更低。这说明政治关系扭曲了银行信贷资本配置，且在一定程度上“挤占”了高质量会计信息企业所需的资本，抑制了其优化资本配置功能的发挥。其启示意义在于，中国经济的持续与健康发展还是得依赖包括会计信息披露在内的正式制度的建设与完善。

英文摘要：

This study compares the banks＇ loan allocation efficiency of political connection with the one of high quality accounting information. Sampling from Chinese private firms listed in SZSE and SHSE during 2001 to 2009, we find political connection does be more likely to help firms get more and longer term loans from banks than accounting information of high quality （Financing Effect）; in addition, with the increasing of loans from banks, the investment efficiency of politically connected firms neither improve nor deteriorate, firms of high quality accounting information, however, greatly increase their investment effi- ciency（Investment Effect）. These mean political connected firms have acquired more loans from banks, but the utilizing effi- ciency does be low. Therefore, we can conclude that political connection distorts the allocation of banks＇ loans, it, to certain extent, extrudes capital necessary for firms with high quality accounting information, which inhibits the function of optimizing capital allocation of high quality accounting information. This finding implies that the sustainable and healthy development of Chinese economy should depend on formal institutions/mechanisms including accounting information disclosure.