知识产权保护是一把“双刃剑”。笼统地强调知识产权保护可能顾此失彼。用实验经济学范式考察网络外部性条件下知识产权保护与否的社会福利匹配,可以清晰地分离网络外部性的社会福利效应。知识产品的生产厂商定价较低时,保护知识产权会增加厂商收益,消费者福利无显著变化,社会福利增加;定价较高时,保护知识产权会降低厂商收益和消费者的福利,从而降低社会福利。强化知识产权保护为厂商制定高价提供了可能,网络外部性为必须消费者增加了效用,二者匹配的桥梁则是边界消费者,但边界消费者扩大网络效应又需要弱化的知识产权保护。
The intellectual property protection is a double-edged sword,discussing intellectual protection generally may loss something important. The match of intellectual property protection with network externality is analyzed in an experimental economics normal form, this analysis can make the social welfare effect of network externality clear. The resuhs show that when the providers of knowledge product give a lower price, the intellectual property protection will increase providers' profit, the consumers' welfare doesn't change significantly, the social welfare increases. When the price is higher, the intellectual property protection will decrease providers' and consumers' profit, and then reduce social welfare. Strengthen the intellectual property protection make the provider giving higher price possible, network externality increase the " necessary consumers' " utility, the bridge of the two sides is "marginal consumers", however, to make the marginal consumers improving network effect, weaken the intellectual property protection is needed.