欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
基于交易成本经济学理论，将联盟的契约设计作为联盟的治理手段，提出了资产专用性、契约复杂度和联盟合作效应三者之间的概念模型，利用SPSS15．0软件和AMOS7．0软件对概念模型进行SCM实证分析并修正了概念模型，修正后的模型能够更好解释三者关系：在战略联盟中，资产专用性对契约复杂程度、合作风险、合作绩效都具有正向的影响；契约复杂程度对合作风险具有负向影响，对合作绩效具有正向影响；即资产专用性越高，企业越倾向于签订复杂的契约，并且联盟中资产的专用性程度和契约的复杂性程度对合作的绩效和风险产生重要的影响。研究结论丰富了战略联盟的理论基础，具有现实意义和应用价值。
英文摘要：
The cooperation of a strategy alliance can be realized by designing appropriate contracts among the members in the alliance. The objective of this paper is to analyze how the contract design impacts the cooperation effectiveness. Based on the theory of trade cost economy （TCE）, a related supply chain management （SCM） concept model is developed to describe the effect of the asset specificity and contract complexity on the alliance cooperation. Then, empirical analysis is carried out by using software packages SPSS15.0 and AMOS7.0. Results show that the higher the asset specificity is, the more the members in the alliance tend to have a complex business contract. Also, both the asset specificity and contract complexity have a significant effect on the performance and risk of the alliance. In this way, the results obtained in this paper reveal the governance mechanism of the contracted alliance cooperation.
位置：
同期刊论文项目
