中文摘要：

本文运用2005--2009年间的172个商业银行的样本数据，从关联贷款角度实证研究了大股东的掏空动机对商业银行审计师选择的影响问题。研究结果显示，商业银行向大股东发放的关联贷款规模越大，越倾向于聘请小型会计师事务所进行审计，表明大股东为了更便捷地获得关联贷款，会对银行的审计师选择施加影响。进一步的研究结果显示，相对于国有商业银行来说，关联贷款对审计师选择的上述影响在民营商业银行中表现得更为明显；银行所在地的政府干预程度越高，关联贷款对审计师选择的影响越显著。本文为商业银行的大股东掏空动机对审计师选择的影响提供了直接的经验证据，从审计师选择角度拓展了商业银行大股东掏空的实现机制问题，丰富了审计师选择、关联贷款及商业银行治理方面的文献，对商业银行及银行监管机构具有较大的借鉴意义。

英文摘要：

Using 172 data of Chinese commercial banks from 2005 to 2009, this paper studies the influence of tunne- ling motivation of big shareholders on auditor choice of commercial banks from the perspective of related loans. The results show that the more related loans are provided , the more likely the commercial banks are to employ small firms of accountants to provide auditing services. This demonstrates that the tunneling motivation of big sharehohters does have an impact on auditor choice of commercial banks. Furthermore, comparing to state-owned commercial banks, the impact of related loans on auditor choice is more significant than on non-state-owned banks. This kind of effect is also strengthened if the province where the bank locates suffers severe government intervention. This paper provides direct evidence for the influence of big shareholders＇ tunneling motivation on banks auditor choice and broadens the study of realization mechanisms of big shareholders＇tunneling behavior. It also contributes to extant lit- erature about auditor choice, related loans and corporate governance of banks and has practical effects to banks and regulators.