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中文摘要：
分析了供应商管理库存环境下,除＂双重边际效应＂以外另一个导致供应链分散决策时零售商订购量下降的因素,即道德风险问题。针对道德风险,采用求解完全且完美信息动态博弈中子博弈完美纳什均衡的一般方法,即逆推归纳法设计了一个数量折扣契约。当参数满足一定关系时,该契约不仅可以有效消除供应商管理库存中的道德风险,而且也使供销双方期望利润实现了帕累托改进,因此该契约不仅是有效的,而且也是可执行的。
英文摘要：
This paper studies the another factor that led to a decline in addition to the＂double marginalization＂ effect in decentralized decision-making for retailer order,namely,the moral hazard problem under the vendor-managed inventory environment.Against the moral hazard,we use of general method for solving sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in complete and perfect information dynamic game,namely,backward induction to design a quantity discount contract.Since the contract does not only make the parties（supplier and retailer） achieve a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium,but also the expected profit of both parties realize pareto improvements,so the contract is not only effective,but also enforceable.
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