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中文摘要：
应用Stackelberg主从博弈模型研究在供应商和销售商的边际成本都随产量递增的情况下，回购契约是如何协调供应链的。文中重点分析了销售商的订货策略、供应商最优契约的设计，特别是批发价的确定。研究结果表明供应商的最优回购契约是：供应商允许销售商对未卖出的订货全部按批发价退货，供应商采用边际成本加成定价的方式来确定批发价，加成比例由市场需求的满足率决定。
英文摘要：
How the buy back contract coordinates the supply chain is researched by using Stackelberg game model under the condition that the supplier＇ s and the retailer＇ s marginal cost functions increase with outputs. The emphases are put on the retailer＇ s ordering strategy, and the design of the supplier＇ s optimal contract, especially on the determining the wholesale price. The result shows that the supplier buys back the all residual order of the retailer at a price of wholesale price, and determines the wholesale price with the method of marginal cost-plus pricing, and the cost-plus ratio is determined with the content ratio to market demand.
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