中文摘要：

信息不对称和分部经理努力激励不足是ICM配置中的主要问题,总部可以针对分部经理设计最优的薪酬激励契约,解决上述问题。文中加入了以前文献忽略而又重要的两个因素：分部项目间的质量差异和相关性,运用机制设计理论构建ICM配置模型。研究结果表明：ICM存在平均主义现象,即总部投资了过多（过少）的资源在弱（强）分部中。这种偏好随项目质量差异程度的提高而提高;项目质量的相关性弱化了ICM平均主义现象,而分部经理努力的相关性加剧了这种现象。

英文摘要：

Information asymmetry and the insufficient incentive of division manager＇s effort are the main problems of internal capital market（ ICM） allocation. Headquarter can solve the problem by giving optimal compensation incentive contract to division managers. The paper constructs ICM allocation model based on mechanism design theory,adding two important factors which were ignored in previous literatures： quality differences among division projects and their correlations. Research result shows that equalitarianism can be found in ICM,that is,headquarters have invested too much（ or much less）resources in weak（ or strong） divisions. The preference increases with the increase of project quality difference; the correlation of project quality weakens the equalitarianism of ICM,while the correlation of division manager＇s effort strengthens the phenomenon.