中文摘要：

文章利用我国上市公司2007—2011年数据研究了公司经理人薪酬辩护和开发支出会计政策隐性选择之间的关联。结果发现，当公司经理人当期薪酬辩护需求相对更大时（如公司当期业绩相对较差、当期薪酬相对较高或两者同时具备），公司更倾向于选择开发支出资本化的会计政策。文章的发现表明，公司会利用开发支出会计政策的隐性选择进行盈余管理，且其目的之一就是进行当期的薪酬辩护或提升未来薪酬辩护空间。

英文摘要：

Based on the data of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2011, this paper investigates the relationship between executives~ compensation justification and the implicit choice of accounting policy of development costs. It shows that with executives＇ greater demand for current compensation justification, namely under relatively poor current corporate performance, relatively higher current com- pensation or both, the companies tend to choose accounting policy based on the capitalization of devel- opment costs. The conclusion suggests that the companies employ the implicit choice of accounting pol- icy of development costs to conduct earnings management for the purpose of justification for current compensation or greater compensation space in the future.