中文摘要：

本文与传统的委托一代理框架不同，在一般均衡框架下研究上市公司管理层报酬与公司股价、市场均衡之间的关系。发现在一个存在做空机制的市场中，即使不考虑上市公司的委托一代理问题，如果不给予上市公司管理层某种形式的额外补偿，市场将极端缺乏效率。在某些极端参数条件下，市场甚至不存在均衡。我们的研究表明：抛开道德方面的考虑，类似美国AIG公司高管这样“肥猫”的存在，在某种意义上是市场经济条件下难以避免的结果。

英文摘要：

Compensation to the corporate management is traditionally approached in the context of the principal-agent theory. In contrast, this paper looks into the relationship among management compensation, the stock price and market equilibrium under the general equilibrium framework. It is found that in a market where short-selling is allowed extreme inefficiency would result if the management of a listed company did not receive extra compensa- tion in one way or another even without taking into account the principal-agent issue. Under certain extreme parameters, there would be no market equilibrium.