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中文摘要：
构造一个股东和管理层之间的合约模型，利用2001年～2004年中国上市公司的数据，对中国上市公司的管理层薪酬、多元化战略及时公司的价值影响进行经验性验证。研究结果表明，高管人员持股比例与公司价值之间是非线性关系，现金薪酬水平与公司价值负相关，多元化对公司价值的影响并不显著。当控制了影响多元化的公司内部因素后，国有股占主导地位的公司多元化程度与管理层持股比例之间是正向关系，与现金薪酬是负向关系，与在职消费正相关，其多元化决策的动因不明显；而非国有股占主导地位的公司，管理层希望从实施多元化战略中获取更多的剩余收益和隐性的私人利益。
英文摘要：
This paper develops a contracting model between shareholders and managers. Using the data of Chinese listed firms during 2001 -2004, the paper makes an empirical test on the relationship among Executive compensation, diversification strategies and firm value. The results show that the relationship between manager＇ s stock-ownership and diversification is non-linear, cash compensation is negative to firm value; incentive doesn＇t have important influence on firm value. Diversification is insignificant by related to finn value. After controlling the specific factors of firm, the paper finds that the level of diversification is positively related to stock ownership insignificantly, but negatively related to cash compensation and positively related to non-pecuniary compensation in firms where the state owned shares are dominant. The reasons why these manager diversify their firms are unclear, while the firms where the non-state share owned are dominant diversify in order to get more private benefit.
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