中文摘要：

针对单制造商和两零售商组成的供应链，假定产品存在次品需返修、产品需求为随机的且受到产品质量和零售商促销努力的影响，运用均衡分析方法建立了零售商为风险中性时的供应链集中式决策模型和分散式决策模型，给出了协调供应链的回购加促销补贴合同。然后基于条件风险值准则建立了零售商为风险厌恶时的供应链集中式决策模型和分散式决策模型，给出了协调该供应链的回购加促销补贴合同。最后的算例表明了模型的合理性和协调合同的有效性。研究表明：零售商越厌恶风险，其订货量越少，制造商、零售商和供应链的收益都将下降；而产品正品率的提高有利于供应链各方；零售商为风险中性时的供应链决策是零售商为风险厌恶者的特例。

英文摘要：

Considering one supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers with the random demand de- pendent on product quality due to the inferior products and retailer＇ s sale promotion. The centralized and decentralized decision models were set up respectively by using the equilibrium method when two retailers are risk-neutral. A buy- back plus promotion subsidy contract was put forward to coordinate the supply chain. Then the centralized and decen- tralized decision models based on CVaR criterion are set up respectively when two retailers are risk-averse, together with a buy-back plus promotion subsidy contract to coordinate this supply chain. Final example demonstrates the reasonability of the proposed models and feasibility of the coordinative contracts. The study reveals that the more risk-averse retailers are, the less order quantities are, which leads to lower profits of manufacturer, retailers and whole supply chain; yet the enhancement of qualified product＇ s rate benefits all agents; the decisions of supply chain with risk-neutral retailers are special cases of those with risk-averse retailers.