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中文摘要：
在现有相关研究成果基础上，以中国国有控股上市公司为背景，从理论和实证2个方面研究股权激励、银行债务约束和控制权私利对我国国有控股上市公司经营者过度投资行为的影响。研究结果表明：公司过度投资行为与公司经营者股权激励反相关，与公司经营者控制权私利正相关。当公司的银行债务融资具有正监管弹性或者较小的负监管弹性时，公司经营者的过度投资行为将随着银行债务融资的增加而减弱；当公司的银行债务融资具有较大的负监管弹性时，公司经营者的过度投资行为将随着银行债务融资的增加而加强。实证研究结果进一步证明了理论研究结果的正确性和合理性。
英文摘要：
On the basis of current literature, taking China＇s state-holding listed companies as background, we study the effects of equity incentives, bank debt constraints and private benefits of control right on managers＇ over-investment behavior of China＇ s state-holding listed companies theoretically and empirically. The theoretical research results show that, the managers＇ over-investment behavior of listed companies are negatively related to their equity incentives and positively related to their private benefits of control right. When bank debt financing has positive regulatory flexibility or small negative regulatory flexibility, managers＇ over-investment behavior of listed companies decreases in their bank debt financing~ and when bank debt financing has big negative regulatory flexibility, managers＇ over-investment behaviors of listed companies increases in their bank debt financing. The empirical research results further test and verify validity and rationality of the above-mentioned theoretical research results.
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