中文摘要：

在地铁车辆的维护决策过程中,公司各部门之间会存在隐形的利益竞争,为探讨这种隐形竞争对车辆设备预防性维护计划的影响.结合地铁车辆设备的动态衰退规律,采用非完美维护策略,建立了设备阶段性衰退的故障率函数模型.基于动态博弈理论,以运营部门与维护部门为博弈参与者,分别建立了运营优先和维护优先的Stackelberg博弈模型,并通过逆向归纳法求得博弈模型的纳什均衡解.结果表明：博弈方法在车辆设备维护决策中是可行且有效的,而且具有优先权的一方在维护决策中更有优势.与传统的优化方法比较,博弈方法的动态性和灵活性强,适应性更好,可为决策管理层提供重要的决策支持.

英文摘要：

The invisible competing interests usually contacts between different departments when decides maintenance plan of metro vehicle. In order to explore the effects of the invisible competition on the preventive maintenance plan, a periodic decline failure rate function model is established through imperfect maintenance strategy. Acting operation department and maintenance department as the players, different Stackelberg game models are established based on dynamic game theory, also backward induction is used to find the Nash equilibrium solution. Experimental results show that the game method is feasible and effective to obtain a reasonable maintenance plan and the preferential player has an advantage. Compared with the optimization method, the game method has the better dynamics flexibility and adaptability, also can solve the interest conflict between the players and provides important decision support for decision makers.