中文摘要：

文章对机构投资者在我国金融机构薪酬管制中的作用进行了研究。研究发现，机构投资者持股比例与银行高管货币薪酬在中央直管银行显著负相关，在非中央直管银行显著正相关，这表明实际控制人性质影响机构投资者在银行高管货币薪酬制定中的作用；投资主导型机构投资者持股比例与银行高管货币薪酬在非中央直管银行显著负相关，业务主导型机构投资者比例与银行高管货币薪酬在非中央直管银行显著正相关，这表明在银行高管货币薪酬制定中异质机构投资者会根据实际控制人的不同选择扮演“监督者”还是“合谋者”角色。

英文摘要：

This article studies the role of institutional investors in the process of the compensation regulation of financial institu- tions in our country. The results indicate that institutional investors＇ shareholding ratio and bank executives＇ monetary compensation has a significant negative correlation in the central governing bank, and has a significant positive correlation in the non central bank, which suggests that the nature of the actual controller affects the role of institutional investors in the bank executive pay making. In- vestment leading institutional investors and bank executives monetary compensation have a significant negative correlation in the non central bank, and the business-oriented institutional investors＇ and bank executives＇ monetary compensation has a significant positive correlation in the non-central bank, which indicates that the different institutional investors will choose the ＂supervisor＂ or ＂collu- sion＂ role according to the nature of the actual controller during the bank executive compensation making.