中文摘要：

以A股公司为样本,以非标准审计意见作为审计治理效应的代理变量,分析了股权分置改革前后外部审计对大股东＂掏空＂治理效应的变化。研究发现,在股权分置改革前,大股东＂掏空＂与非标准审计意见显著正相关,外部审计对大股东＂掏空＂具有揭示和抑制作用;但在股权分置改革后,外部审计对大股东＂掏空＂的揭示和抑制作用下降。审计治理效应发生变化的原因在于,股权分置改革后大股东为了顺利套现,存在购买审计意见的强烈动机,这一动机对审计意见的影响显著降低了外部审计的治理效应。

英文摘要：

Taking A-share companies as samples and nonstandard audit opinions as proxy vari- ables of the effect of audit governance, this paper analyses the changes of the governance effects on the ＂asset-stripping＂ of major shareholders by external audit before and after equity division reform. The study finds that before the reform, ＂asset-stripping＂ by major shareholders is significantly and positively correlated with nonstandard audit opinions, that is to say that the external audit can play a revealing and restraining role to the ＂asset-stripping＂ by the major shareholders. But after the re- form, their role has significantly reduced, so the effect of audit governance declines. The reason for the changes of audit governance effects lies in that, after the equity division reform, the major share- holders want to cash out successfully, so they have a strong motivation of purchasing audit opinion, which affects the audit opinion significantly and reduces the effect of governance by the external au- dit.