中文摘要：

运用博弈论对银行、企业、担保机构三方的合作过程进行分析，并将其运用到我国信用担保的风险分担机制特别是比例担保和反担保机制的设计上。研究发现，比例担保是比全额担保更为有利的选择，在实际操作中担保机构应承担较大的比例；另外还论证了要求企业提供足额的反担保品能够有效防范其道德风险，长期合作的情况下对反担保品的要求可适当降低。依据理论分析成果，对于担保比例问题提出了政策建议。

英文摘要：

This paper constructs the game model between the bank, the credit guarantee institution and the SMEs in the SME cooperative process and uses it to design the mechanism of allocation of risks, especially counter guarantee and pro- portional guarantee, which provides theoretical basis for allocation of risks. Conclusions are as follows： proportional guarantee is better than full guarantee; enough counter collateral can prevent moral hazard; long - term cooperation can lower counter collateral. Finally the paper gives the suggestion for the setting of the counter guarantee mechanism according the actual situation.