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中文摘要：
多元化战略实施过程中高管持股作为一种长期激励机制其设计是否合理将直接影响企业战略收益的实现，在文献回顾的基础上分析高管持股利益趋同效应对多元化战略成功实施的积极意义以及公司治理强弱对高管持股效应的影响。对沪深两市2005年674家上市公司的数据进行实证分析，结果表明提高高管持股激励强度能有效改善多元化战略的实施效果，但高管持股分布设计差异影响利益趋同效应的发挥。公司治理作为企业战略实施的保障机制，可以有效地避免高管持股的壕沟防御效应，企业应该从高管持股分布设计和公司治理等多个维度同步建设入手，为多元化战略的成功实施创造条件。
英文摘要：
As an important long term incentive mechanism, managerial ownership and its design will directly influence benefits from diversification implementation effectively. Based on literature review, the paper analyzes the positive meaning of managerial ownership convergence of interest effects for implementing diversification strategy, and the effects of corporate governance on managerial ownership effects. Analyzing data of 674 firms from listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 2005, the empirical results suggest ： increasing the degree of managerial ownership incentive will effectively improve performance of diversification implementation, but the differences of design influence its convergence of interest effects. As the guarantee mechanism of implementing strategy, effective corporate governance can avoid managerial entrenchment effects effectively. Firm should create agreeable environments for diversification implementation based on managerial ownership status design and corporate governance simultaneously.
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