中文摘要：

本文实证检验终极控制股东（终极控制股东的控制权、现金流量权、控制权和现金流量权的分离度、金字塔层级、终极控制股东类型）、社会资本如何影响银行贷款契约（贷款利率、贷款金额、贷款期限、贷款担保），以及终极控制股东和银行贷款契约之间的关系如何受社会资本的影响。研究发现：（1）终极控制股东的控制权越强、控制权和现金流量权的分离度越大、金字塔层级的数量越多，银行贷款契约越倾向于紧缩（贷款利率越高、贷款金额越少、贷款期限越短、贷款担保越严格）；终极控制股东的现金流量权越多、终极控制股东类型是国有属性，银行贷款契约越倾向于宽松（贷款利率越低、贷款金额越多、贷款期限越长、贷款担保越宽松）。（2）高水平的社会资本有助于削弱终极控制股东的控制权、控制权和现金流量权的分离度、金字塔层级对银行贷款契约的负向影响，有助于增强终极控制股东的现金流量权、国有属性的终极控制股东对银行贷款契约的正向影响。

英文摘要：

This article empirically studies the impact of ultimate controlling shareholder（including the control rights of the firm＇s largest ultimate owner, the cash-flow rights, the deviation between control rights and cash-flow rights, the pyramid ownership structure, the type of largest ultimate owner） and social capital on the bank loan contracts（including the Rate, amount, maturity, and guarantee of the loan）, and how social capital affects the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholder and bank loan contracts. The empirical results indicate that the stronger the control rights of the largest ultimate owner, the greater the divergence between control and cash-flow rights, and the more the pyramid layers, the tighter the bank loan contracts will be（the higher rate, the less amount, the shorter maturity, and the stricter guarantee of the loan）. Additionally the more the cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner, the looser the bank loan contracts will be（the lower rate, the more amount, the longer maturity, and the looser guarantee of the loan）. Moreover the better development of social capital will help weaken the negative impact of the control rights, the deviation between control rights and cash-flow rights, and the pyramid ownership structure on the bank loan contracts. It will also help strengthen the positive impact of the cash-flow rights and the type of largest ultimate owner on the bank loan contracts.