中文摘要：

随着水污染态势的目益加剧，急需改变原有的政府考核机制，树立生态文明建设的新政绩观。在生态文明考核的视角下，考虑到河流中污染量变化影响，本文构建了基于连续时间的政府与企业水污染治理微分博弈模型，并获得了一组反馈纳什均衡解．得出了相对于生态文明环保政绩考核重要性的企业污染物产量下降梯度和政府治污努力上升梯度。分析表明：企业的均衡污染物产量与生态文明环保政绩考核重要性水平负相关；政府的均衡治污努力与生态文明环保政绩考核重要性水平正相关；企业的均衡污染物产量与单位排污费负相关；降低企业的生产成本、减排成本，加大对不法排污企业的处罚力度．均可提高控污效果；制定合理的地方政府生态文明环保政绩奖惩制度。可提高其治污努力程度。此外，本文还运用数值仿真，验证了生态文明环保政绩考核的重要性水平与企业的污染物产量和政府的治污努力的关系。最后提出有效解决河流污染问题的相关对策措施：从考核的分配公平维度、程序公平维度和互动公平维度来构建合理的生态文明环保政绩考核机制。并提高生态文明指标在政府政绩考核中的权重；构建合理的生态文明环保政绩奖惩机制，该机制与地方政府的政治利益、经济利益挂钩，也与官员的个人利益、地方政府利益和部门利益、政府组织的整体利益挂钩：建立企业排污行为奖惩机制，包括对企业超标排放的处罚和对积极实行减排技术创新、清洁生产企业的奖励。制定合理的排污费的收取标准；增强自主创新能力。降低企业的生产成本、减排成本；提高政府环境保护工作能力。降低政府的治污工程成本和管理成本。

英文摘要：

With the water pollution problem becoming more and more serious, administrators need to change their original system of performance achievement evaluation and build a new performance achievements view of ecological civilization. From the view of achievement evaluation of ecological civilization, this paper develops a continuous-time differential game of water pollution control between local government and enterprises with the consideration of dynamic change of pollutants in the rivers. And we obtain a set of feedback Nash equilibrium for the problem and the partial derivatives of enterprise＇ s equilibrium pollutants output and government＇ s equilibrium pollution abatement effort with respect to the weight of environmental index in the achievement evaluation system of government. The results that we can get from this paper show that enterprise ＇ s equilibrium pollutants output is negatively related to the weight of environmental index in the achievement evaluation system of government and the charges for disposing pollutants per unit. Government＇ s equilibrium pollution abatement effort is positively related to the weight of environmental index in the achievement evaluation system of government. A decrease in the cost of production and pollution abatement can improve the pollution control effect of the weight of environmental index in the achievement evaluation system of government. And imposing more penalties on enterprises that discharge over standard will also have this effect. Furthermore, establishing rational rewards and punishment system could encourage local government to work harder in pollution abatement. In addition, this paper verifies the relationship between enterprise＇ s pollutants output, government ＇ s pollution abatement effort and the weight of environmental index in the achievement evaluation system of government. Finally, we suggest that it is necessary to take some measures to solve the water pollution problem. First, we could construct a rational performance evaluation mechanism