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中文摘要：
本文针对一个供应商和零售商组成的供应链系统,主要研究零售商如何设计提前订货折扣来吸引顾客提前订货;而供应商如何根据市场需求的不确定性,设计零售商提前订货资金的付款时间等问题。在供应商-Stackelberg框架下,以期望利润为目标,建立了相应的决策模型。通过对模型的分析求解,给出了不同市场环境下供应商要求零售商支付提前订货资金的策略。最后,用算例验证了模型和理论分析的可行性。
英文摘要：
We consider a supply chain that consists of a supplier and a retailer,selling a single product to the customers over a short selling season.In this paper,we mainly research how the retailer uses the ABD program to entice customers to pre-commit their orders and how the supplier designs the payment plan so as to maximize his/her own expected profit.Under the supplier-Stackelberg game,the paper gets the decision models based on the object of expected profit.Solving the models,we have got the optimal solutions and obtained some effective theorems.Finally,we provide a detailed numerical example to illustrate the model and the theoretical analysis.
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