中文摘要：

文章以2010—2013年沪深A股上市公司为样本，实证检验了CEO权力、产品市场竞争对高管在职消费的影响。研究发现：CEO权力与高管在职消费呈显著的正相关关系，CEO权力越大，在职消费水平越高；相对非国有企业来说，国有企业的在职消费更多，国有企业CEO权力对在职消费的影响更显著；随着公司所在行业产品市场竞争的加剧，公司高管权力对在职消费的影响得到有效抑制，相对非国有企业来说，国有企业的在职消费明显减少，产品市场竞争更明显地抑制了国有企业CEO权力对在职消费的影响。研究结论还说明打破行业垄断，降低行业准入门槛，促进市场竞争，有助于治理和解决中国上市公司（尤其是国有企业）中普遍存在的高管在职消费问题。

英文摘要：

With 2010 to 2013 Shanghai and Shenzhen A - share listed companies as samples, this paper empirically examines the impact of CEO power and product market competition on the on - the - job consumption of senior executives. The study shows that CEO power and the on - the -job consumption of them have significant positive correlation. The greater of the power, the higher level of the consumption. Compared with non - state - owned enterprises, SOEs have more on-the-job consumption. That is, the impact of CEO power of SOEs is more significant on the consumption. With the product market competition of a company becomes more and more intense in the industry, the impact of executive power on the consumption is effectively controlled, and the on - the - job consumption of SEOs significantly decreased compared with non - state - owned en- terprises. Product market competition significantly restrains the impact of the power of CEO on the consumption in SOEs. Conclusions pre that it is beneficial for China to control and resolve the problem of on - the - job consumption of senior executives in listed SOEs） by breaking market competition. companies （ especially in industrial monopolies, lowering the industrial barriers to entry and promoting