中文摘要：

中国当前的地区市场分割形势依然不容乐观，虽然大量研究讨论了影响中国地区市场分割的各种因素．但均忽略了当前地区市场分割陷入“囚徒困境”这一特征事实．．本文以“价格法”计算的市场分割指数为被解释变量．使用1992--2010年的中国省际面板数据．构建空间面板数据模型实证检验了中国地方政府在市场分割方面的策略互动行为。并探讨了影响地区间市场分割策略互动的因素。研究结果表明．中国地区间市场分割水平存在显著的空间自相关性，从而证实了地区间市场分割策略互动行为的存在：即使改变度量市场分割的指标，上述结论依然成立。此外，财政分权强化了地区间市场分割的策略互动．而中央转移支付则有效弱化了地区间市场分割的策略互动。由于地区市场分割陷入了“囚徒困境”．因此要破解当前的局面必须从导致“囚徒困境”的背后根源入手．改革“中国式分权”下的激励机制。

英文摘要：

Presently, the situation of China＇s regional market segmentation remains unoptinfistic. A great deal of researches have discussed various factors affecting China＇s regional market segmentation, however, the characteristic fact that today＇s regional market segmentation is felled into the prisoners＇ dilemma has been ignored. This paper regards market segmentation index calculated by the price method as dependent variable, utilizes provincial panel data from 1992 to 2010 and constructs spatial panel data model to test strategic interaction of Chinese local governments and analyze the influence factors of the strategic interaction. We find that, market segmentation levels among Chinese local governments bear significant spatial autocorrelation which confirms the existence of strategic interaction among different regions. This finding establishes still when we change index measuring market segmentation. In addition, fiscal decentralization strengthens the strategic interaction of regional market segment, while the central transfer payments effectively weaken the strategic interaction. As the result, to solve the prisoners＇ dilemma of regional market segmentation, we need to pay attention to China＇s decentralization and reform the incentive mechanism nested in Chinese style decentralization.