中文摘要：

由于中国地方政府对经济的强大影响力，政府官员变更可能会影响当地部分企业的生存与发展。其中的影响机制有：政策不连续性、官员贪腐行为以及政企关系重新调整等。为此，本文收集了中国1999--2009年2000多任地级市市长和市委书记的数据，并与辖区内的企业匹配来识别地方官员对企业生存的影响。运用Kaplan—Meier乘积限估计方法绘制的生存函数和风险函数图显示,官员变更时企业的生存时间更短、倒闭风险更高。在此基础上运用生存分析模型进行更为精确的实证检验，结果发现：官员变更会显著增加企业的倒闭风险,并且这一风险存在多期滞后效应；但官员变更引致的退出风险在不同所有制企业之间有所不同，其中,对国有企业、尤其是非中央国有企业的风险增加尤为明显：任期的稳定有助于降低企业经营风险。并且任期对官员变更导致的风险有调节作用。本文还特别关注了官员自身特征对变更引致风险的影响，发现本地晋升的官员、在出生地任职的官员、学历水平较高的官员引致的企业倒闭风险较低。本研究为如何降低官员变更引发的企业经营风险提供了具有可行性的决策依据，同时为科学制定官员选拔和任用制度提供了有益的政策启示。

英文摘要：

Because of the great influence of local government on the economy, official turnover may affect some local enterprises survival and development. The mechanisms included policy discontinuity, corrupt behavior and reconstructing relationship between government and enterprises. This paper collected the data of more than 2000 mayors and secretaries from 1999 to 2009 in China, and matched with the enterprises to identify the official＇s influence on survival of enterprises. The survival function and the risk function diagram drawn by using the Kaplan-Meier method shows that survival time of enterprise facing official change is shorter and risk is higher. The paper using survival analysis model found that official turnover increased the enterprise exit risk and had multiple hysteresis effect. The exit risk caused by the official turnover is different in different ownership enterprises, the state-owned enterprises, especially the risk of non central state-owned enterprises increased obviously. The term stability helps reduce business risk. The paper by further controlling the officials of their own characteristics found that the risk caused by local promotion officials, higher education officials or taking office in birthplace official is low. This study provides a basis for decision making on how to reduce the risk caused by the change of official, meanwhile provides a useful policy implication for the scientific establishment of the official selection and appointment system.