中文摘要：

运用2004-2011年的非平衡面板数据,对创业型家族企业中的亲缘关系如何影响代理成本进行实证研究。结论如下：1家族成员卷入企业经营管理的可能性和程度可以有效地降低代理成本;2家族成员担任董事或者CEO可以有效地降低与在职消费关联的代理成本,但在降低与管理效率关联的代理成本方面作用并不显著。此外,研究表明董事会规模和独立性不能有效地降低代理成本。

英文摘要：

To study how kindred relationship of entrepreneurial family firm influences agency cost, an empirical study is conducted with unbalanced panel data from 2004 to 2011. The following conclusions are drawn： （1） the involvement probability and degree of family member can effectively reduce agency cost, （2） family member holding positions as director or CEO can effectively reduce agency cost relative to company-paid consumption, but the effect is not-significant to reduce the cost relative to management efficiency. Moreover, the results imply the size and independence of board may not reduce agency costs effectively.