中文摘要：

消费者网络购物面临的不确定性往往导致非质量原因的退货。合理发布产品信息，并提供退货保障，是网络零售商促进消费者购买和提高利润的有效策略。基于消费者效用理论和博弈论，构建了产品信息影响消费者购买和退货模型，研究了零售商在垄断和竞争情形下的产品信息发布决策问题，发现垄断性零售商的最优信息发布策略和竞争性零售商在发布产品信息量和信息内容方面的均衡策略均取决于产品价值和退货成本特征，提出了不同市场结构下基于产品特征的在线商品信息发布策略。

英文摘要：

The uncertainty faced by consumers usually results in false failure returns when they purchase products online. For the online retailer, making a proper information disclosure strategy and providing a reasonable money back guarantee are effective measures to promote sales and increase profit. Based on consumer utility theory and game theory, this paper conducts a stylized model, which shows how the firm influences customers＇ uncertainty and return probability by disclosing product information. By analyzing firm＇ s optimal information strategy in mo- nopolistic and duopolistic cases, this paper suggests firm＇ s strategy is determined by product characteristics, which are related to product value and return cost. This paper generates implications of product information dis- closure for online retailers.