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中文摘要：
大股东控制导致了大股东的滥用控股权行为，造成了对中小投资者和债权人的利益侵害，并降低了企业价值。通过建立博弈模型，分析存在大股东侵占的情况下，小股东、法人股东与债权人对大股东的监督博弈问题。研究结果表明，小股东对大股东的监督自愿供给严重不足，在企业负债融资的情况下，债权人总是有激励提供对大股东的监督，而小股东和法人股东却偏好于“搭便车”，这也从另一个方面证明了负债融资的治理机制。
英文摘要：
Major shareholder control induces the abuse of ownership of large shareholder, which results in the entrenchment of minority shareholders and creditors and decreases the value of corporation. By building the game model, the supervision from minority shareholders, corporate shareholders and creditors is analyzed on the condition of controlling shareholder entrenchment. The research results show that the supervision offered by minority investors is deficient ; The creditors always offer efficient supervision under the debt financing of corporation, while minority shareholders and corporate shareholders prefer free- riding, which testifies the discretional governance mechanism of debt financing.
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