中文摘要：

与传统的税审计不同，有自我审计的管理是由纳税人的审计的联合他自己和由税权威的审计。这篇论文主要与自我审计和它的相关性质在管理下面学习一个纳税人逃税的最佳的政策，以便推出一些有效建议和理论底制止逃税。当审计被执行时，假设仅仅避的税的某个比例能被发现，作者首先与自我审计提出一个静态的模型。这个模型被划分成二个阶段。在第一个阶段，纳税人声明他们的税，然后，税权威选择审计目标基于已知的可能性，并且宣布结果；如果纳税人被选择，他将进入第二个阶段，他在期间有一个机会缴避的税和相应迟了的费用然后被税权威审计。作者在第一个阶段和最佳的比例显示出逃税的最佳的数量的存在和唯一到在第二个阶段自我暴露。作者也讨论内部解决方案的相关性质，并且在一些参数上做弹性分析。而且，作者把静态的模型扩大到相应二时期的模型，并且学习扩大模型的答案的存在和唯一。在当审计被执行时，逃税能仅仅与某个概率被发现的假设下面，最后，作者与自我审计提出另一个静态的模型并且调查它的性质。

英文摘要：

Different from traditional tax audit, supervision with self-audit is a combination of audit by the taxpayer himself and audit by the tax authority. This paper mainly studies a taxpayer＇s optimal policy of tax evasion under supervision with self-audit and its related properties, in order to deduce some effective suggestions and theoretical bases to restrain tax evasion. Assuming that only a certain proportion of evaded tax can be discovered when the audit is executed, the authors first formulate a static model with self-audit. This model is divided into two stages. At the first stage, taxpayers declare their taxes, then the tax authority chooses audit objects, based on a known probability, and announces the result; if the taxpayer is chosen, he will enter the second stage, during which he has a chance to pay the evaded tax and the corresponding late fees and then is audited by the tax authority. The authors show the existence and uniqueness of the optimal amount of tax evasion at the first stage and the optimal proportion to self-expose at the second stage. The authors also discuss the related properties of the interior solution, and do elasticity analyses on some parameters. Besides, the authors extend the static model into the corresponding two-period model, and study the existence and uniqueness of the solution of the extended model. Finally, under the assumption that tax evasion can only be discovered with a certain probability when the audit is executed, the authors formulate another static model with self-audit and investigate its properties.