中文摘要：

基于国有企业改制上市的制度背景，本文从缓解社会性负担压力的动机角度，研究了大股东（集团）社会性负担对其占用上市公司资金的影响。经验证据表明，上市时，大股东承担的社会性负担越多，大股东在上市后三年中非经营性占用上市公司资金的概率越高且占用资金规模越大，而经营性占用资金与大股东集团社会性负担无关。本文首次从社会性负担角度探讨了国有大股东侵占上市公司的动机，为国有企业整体改制上市提供了新的证据支持。

英文摘要：

Based on the institutional background of the restructuring and listing of China SOEs, this paper examines the effects of blockholders＇ （or the groups＇） social burdens on their fund embezzlement in listed companies from the perspective of the motivation of easing pressure from social burdens. Empirical evidence shows that the heavier the social burdens that block.holders assume when listing, the higher is the probability of fund embezzlement, and the more funds are transferred by blockholders through non- operational receivables during the three years after listing, while blockholders＇ social burdens have no impact on their fund embezzlement through operational receivables. This paper provides new evidence for the restructuring and listing of SOEs as a whole by adopting the perspective of social burdens to explore the motivation of state-owned blockholders to tunnel in listed companies.