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供应链多边谈判中的马尔科夫型谈判策略
  • 期刊名称:系统工程学报
  • 时间:0
  • 页码:616-621
  • 语言:中文
  • 分类:F715.4[经济管理—产业经济]
  • 作者机构:[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049, [2]机械制造系统国家重点实验室,陕西西安710049, [3]过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室,陕西西安710049
  • 相关基金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872091); 高等学校博士点专项基金资助项目(20090201110031)
  • 相关项目:研发过程质量管理方法与控制技术研究
作者: 苏秦|刘强|
中文摘要:

构建了单买方多供应商多边谈判模型,其中整个过程由买方和单个供应商的双边谈判序列构成.重点探讨了买方采取两种马尔科夫型双边谈判策略——半前视策略和半后视策略情形下供应链多边谈判的均衡.研究表明,如果买方采取半前视策略,则当买方的讨价还价力小于供应商群体的讨价还价力时,买方最优策略退化为朴素策略;如果买方采取半后视策略,买方最优策略取决于供应商讨价还价力,给出了买方代表已经完成双边谈判的供应商最佳个数的求解程序.

英文摘要:

A single-buyer-multi-supplier multilateral negotiation is established in which the whole process is composed of the sequence of bilateral negotiations held by the buyer and single supplier.The equilibrium of supply chain multilateral negotiation is deeply discussed in cases that the buyer chooses the two Markovian bilateral negotiation strategies,that is,sub-forward looking strategy and sub-backward looking strategy,respectively.It is shown that if the buyer chooses the sub-forward looking strategy,the buyer's optimal strategy is naive strategy when the buyer's bargaining power is less than the supplier group's;if the buyer chooses the sub-backward looking strategy,the buyer's optimal strategy depends on the supplier's bargaining power and the paper gives the derivation procedure of the optimal number of suppliers stood for by the buyer,who have finished bilateral negotiation.

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