中文摘要：

在随机的市场需求条件下，本文针对风险中性制造商为主导和风险规避零售商为随从的两级供应链，构建了单源渠道和双源渠道情形下供应链Stackelberg博弈模型，对比分析了不同情形下供应链均衡策略的变化。研究结果表明零售商的风险规避只能改变零售渠道的价格，而不会影响制造商批发价格和电子直销价格的制定；电子直销渠道市场份额会影响制造商和零售商决策的制定，减缓零售商的风险规避影响程度，品牌差异策略并不能完全协调渠道间的冲突。

英文摘要：

In the market demand for the random condition, for a two echelon supply chain attendant with a risk neutral manufacturer as a leader and a risk aversion retailer as a follower, the paper constructs the supply chain Stackelberg model for two cases of single channel and dual channel, and carries out comparative analysis of the change of equilibrium strategies in supply chain under different conditions. The results show that, the retailer＇s risk aversion can only change the price of retail channels, without affecting the making manufacturers wholesale prices and electronic direct selling price; electronic direct channel market share will influence the formulation of manufacturers and retailers decision, and decrease the influence of risk aversion; brand differentiation strategy cann＇t coordinate the inter channel conflict completely.