中文摘要：

当前,＂主制造商-供应商＂的协同合作模式成为复杂产品的主流生产模式,与传统的制造商供应商合作激励相比,该合作模式更关注供应商的努力水平和长期战略合作,其努力程度决定了复杂产品的生产质量与效率。为激励供应商的努力合作,本文设计努力程度参数,提出了主制造商分摊供应商努力成本的激励策略,建立了基于努力程度的最优成本分摊模型,研究了Nash均衡和Stackelberg均衡两种结构下的激励模式,给出该激励模式下的主制造商分摊供应商研制成本的最优比例、最优努力水平和最优收益。研究结果表明,当供应商的努力程度大于等于努力阀值时,主制造商需分担供应商的努力成本,成本分担大小与供应商努力程度的平方成正比,且受单位收益系数和努力程度收益影响系数的影响。同时,研究表明,在主制造商供应商的协同合作机制中,主从关系的Stackelberg博弈收益优于Nash均衡收益,应用分析进一步表明,主制造商通过分担供应商努力成本的激励措施可以有效地激励供应商的努力程度,实现在主制造商供应商利益均增长的情况下,达到帕累托改进。本文系统地揭示了主制造商激励供应商的最优成本分担问题,为复杂产品主制造商供应商的长期战略合作激励策略制定提供决策依据。

英文摘要：

At present, the ＂main manufacturer-suppliers＂ collaborative model becomes the main production model of complex products. Compared with the traditional collaborative model, the ＂main manufacturer- suppliers＂ collaborative model pays more attention on supplier＇s effort level rather than cooperation stimulation between manufacturers and suppliers. The effort level of suppliers determines the level of complex production＇s production quality and efficiency. In order to promote the effort level of supplies and establish the long-term strategic partner, some research are conducted as follows, to design the parameters of effort level and propose the motivation strategy which involve the effort cost-sharing issue between the manufacture and suppliers; to establish the optimal cost-sharing model based on the effort level of suppliers; to discuss the motivation model under the two kinds of structure （Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg e- quilibrium）. According to the cos-tsharing issues between the manufacture and suppliers, the optimal cost- sharing ratio, optimal effort level and optimal reward are given. Results show that, when the effort level is equal or greater than the effort threshold value, the main manufacturer need to share the effort cost of the suppliers. On this occasion, there exists the optimal cost-sharing ratio. At the same time, the size of cost- sharing, influenced by unit gain coefficient and effort gain influence coefficient, is proportional to the square of the effort level of suppliers. Meanwhile, when the suppliers adopt the optimal effort strategy, they can achieve the optimal performance. In the meantime, this study shows that under the ＂main manufacturer - suppliers＂ collaborative model, Stackelberg equilibrium game which contains the master-slave re- lationship is superior to Nash equilibrium game. Furthering study by examples shows that the main manu- facturer can adopt the motivation strategy about cost-sharing of suppliers to stimulate the effort level of suppliers and ensur