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中文摘要：
针对互补品需求的相互关联性造成互补品企业广告促销存在溢出效应的现象,构建了基于广告分担率的互补品企业合作广告博弈模型,对比研究了斯坦克尔伯格博弈和纳什合作博弈下互补品企业双方的最优广告决策和收益,论证了纳什合作博弈均衡具有帕累托优势,并利用鲁宾斯坦恩——斯塔尔讨价还价模型对增加的收益进行了分配,得到了一种帕累托最优合作方案,实现了互补品销售系统的协调。最后,通过数值算例说明了有关命题的有效性。
英文摘要：
Aimed at the spillover effect in advertising and sales promotion between enterprises producing complementary goods,a cooperative advertising game model based on participate rate between the complementary goods enterprises is developed.The optimal strategies and profits of the complementary goods enterprises under Stackelberg game and Nash cooperative game are compared,and those under Nash cooperative are proved having Pareto advantage.Further,the surplus of advertising cooperation is shared by using Rubinstein bargaining model,and a Pareto cooperative scheme which can coordinae marketing systems is obtained.A numerical example is given to demonstrate the validity of the conclusions.
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