中文摘要：

文章分析我国城市商业银行的审计师选择对其计提贷款损失准备的影响。实证研究发现，“四大”事务所审计的城市商业银行计提的贷款损失准备更高；由于信息效应的作用，本地事务所审计的城市商业银行计提的贷款损失准备更高；但是这种效应主要体现在“四大”所审计的城市商业银行中。上述结果表明，“四大”所发挥了较好的监督作用。进一步的研究发现，城市商业银行的第一大股东持股比例越高，越倾向选择“四大”所审计。相比非国有城市商业银行，国有城市商业银行更倾向选择小所。如果同时考虑事务所是否为“四大”所和本地所，则城市商业银行第一大股东的持股比例越高，越倾向于选择异地“四大”所审计。相比非国有城市商业银行，国有城市商业银行更不可能聘请异地“四大”所审计。

英文摘要：

This article analyzes the influence of auditor choice on the city commercial banks＇ loan loss provisions. Our research finds out that city commercial banks audited by the ＂Big Four＂ audit firms reserve greater loan loss provisions. Because of information effect, city commercial banks audited by local auditors reserve greater loan loss provisions, and this effect is more significant in city commercial banks audited by ＂Big Four＂. The above results mean that ＂Big Four＂ plays a good supervisory role. Further research indicates that the larger the first shareholder＇ s shareholding ratio is, the more likely the city commercial banks select ＂Big Four＂ for auditing. Compared with non-stated-owned city commercial banks, stated-owned city commercial banks tend to employ small auditors. Considering ＂Big Four＂ characteristics together with locality, the larger the first shareholder＇s shareholding ratio is, the more likely city commercial banks select non-local ＂Big Four＂ for auditing. Compared to non-stated-owned city commercial banks, state-owned city commercial banks tend not to hire non-local ＂Big Four＂.