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中文摘要：
通过对政府干预企业投资活动的理论阐释与动机的分析,本文研究了政府干预对企业投资效率与价值的影响。研究发现：（1）整体而言,政府干预加剧了企业的过度投资,对企业投资不足的缓解却具有非对称性。（2）由于产权控制特征的不同,政府干预对企业投资效率的影响存在差异,民营企业的投资不足和地方国有企业的过度投资对地区政府干预程度的敏感性交替最大化。（3）政府干预对国有企业投资不足的缓解,是政府推动投资扩张动机整体抬高了投资率的结果。（4）进一步的研究发现：在政府干预程度较高的地区,地方国有企业的过度投资与市场价值之间显著正相关;相反,在市场化进程较快的地区,民营企业的投资不足则具有负面的市场反应。企业投资效率与价值效应的非一致性表明,政府干预是经济转型过程中市场化程度滞后的一种制度性替代机制。
英文摘要：
Based on explanation and motivation of government intervention in enterprise investment activities, this paper studies the effect of government intervention, property characteristics on enterprise investment efficiency. The results show that ： （ 1 ） O- verall, the government intervention exacerbated overinvestment, but cannot ease underinvestment. （2） Due to property control characteristics, the influence of government intervention on the efficiency of business investment is different. Overinvestment of local state - owned enterprises and underinvestment of private enterprises have maximum sensitivity of the government＇ s interven- tion. （3） The government intervention ease underinvestment of state - owned enterprises is the results of government investment expansion motivation, and raises the whole investment rate. （4） Further study found out that in the high government intervention area, between overinvestment of the local state - owned enterprises has significant positive correlation to the market value; on the contrary, in the area where marketization develops faster, private enterprise investment has a negative market reaction. As the in- vestment efficiency and value effect are not coincident, the government intervention is a kind of substitution mechanism of market economic transition process.
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