作为权力制衡的重要手段,内部控制能否制约管理层信息操纵行为进而降低股价崩盘风险值得深入研究。文章选取2000~2015年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,通过理论分析和实证检验考察了内部控制质量影响股价崩盘风险的客观表现和传导路径。结果表明,随着上市公司内部控制质量的不断提升,股价崩盘风险显著降低;在进行了内生性检验、变更内部控制质量度量方法等一系列稳健性测试后,上述结论依然成立。进一步的影响机制分析和中介效应检验表明,信息披露质量和代理成本在内部控制质量影响股价崩盘风险中均发挥了显著的中介作用,即高质量的内部控制可以通过提升信息披露质量和减少代理成本来降低股价崩盘风险,该结论为深入理解内部控制影响股价崩盘风险的内在机制提供了可靠解释。
Whether internal control, an important means of power balance, can play a role in restricting the manage- ment information manipulation activities and reducing the stock price crash risk is worth further study. This paper selects A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from the year 2000 to 2015 as samples, and theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the objective performance and the transmission path of internal con- trol affecting stock price crash risk. The study finds that with continued improvement of internal control quality, the stock prices crash risk significantly reduced. After a series of robustness tests including endogenous tests and chan- ges the internal control quality measurement methods, the above conclusion is still valid. Further impact mechanism analysis and mediating effect tests showed that both information disclosure quality and agency cost play an interme- diary role,i, e. , high-quality internal control can reduce the stock price crash risk by improving information disclo- sure quality and reducing agency costs. The research of this paper can provide a reliable explanation for understand- ing the internal mechanism of the impact of internal control on the stock prices crash risk.