中文摘要：

薪酬委员会的目标之一是为上市公司制定良好的薪酬制度，使经理层与股东利益一致，从而提升公司价值。我国引入的薪酬委员会制度能实现该目标吗？文章选择2002--2006年上市公司自愿设立薪酬委员会作为研究样本，就有效契约论和经理人权力理论对薪酬委员会制度是否有助于提高公司薪酬业绩敏感度进行了理论阐释和实证检验。研究发现：（1）自愿设立薪酬委员会的上市公司的高管薪酬越高，薪酬业绩敏感度越低；（2）公司相对业绩水平会影响薪酬委员会的作用，尤其是相对业绩较差的公司，设立薪酬委员会显著降低了薪酬业绩敏感度；（3）市场化进程也会影响薪酬委员会的作用，市场化程度高（低）会显著增强（减弱）薪酬委员会设立对薪酬业绩敏感度的影响。研究结果表明，薪酬委员会制度的自愿设立更符合经理人权力理论，薪酬委员会的强制设立在短期内并未对提升高管薪酬业绩敏感度发挥作用。

英文摘要：

A compensation committee is designed to formulate sound pay system for listed compa- nies and realize the interest consistency between managerial level and stockholders, thereby improving firm values. Will the compensation committee system in China help to realize the objective？ Based on a sample of listed companies with voluntary establishment of compensation committees from 2002 to 2006, this paper theoretically interprets and empirically tests the positive role of compensation committee sys- tem in compensation-performance sensitivity based on effective contract view and manager power theory. It arrives at the following conclusions： firstly, in listed companies with voluntary compensation commit- tees, executive compensation is higher and the compensation-performance sensitivity is lower; secondly, the relative performance affects the role of compensation committees, and especially in companies with poor relative performance, the establishment of compensation committees can significantly reduce the compensation-performance sensitivity; thirdly, marketization process also affects the role of compensa tion committees, namely high-degree/low-degree marketization can significantly strengthen/weaken the effect of the establishment of compensation committees shows that the voluntary establishment of compensation on the compensation-performance sensitivity. It committees is more in accordance with manager power theory and the compulsory establishment of compensation committees does not exert the role in the increase in the compensation-performance sensitivity in the short run.